WAS 7/10 A HOAX BY ISRAEL TO OCCUPY PALESTINE?
By AI-ChatGPS5-T.Chr.-Human Synthesis-06 October 2025
Where was the normally so effective Israeli surveillance? Here’s a clear summary of what went wrong with Israel’s normally exceptional surveillance and early-warning systems that day:
Strategic Overconfidence
Israel’s intelligence agencies — Shin Bet, Mossad, and Military Intelligence (Aman) — had come to believe Hamas was deterred and focused on governing Gaza, not on launching a full-scale assault.
They interpreted unusual Hamas training activity as defensive, not offensive. This mindset of “conceptzia” (a Hebrew term meaning a fixed belief or assumption) blinded them to the signs of an imminent attack.
Electronic and Drone Jamming
Hamas used low-tech and silent communication methods — wired landlines, couriers, and coded mosque messages — to avoid electronic detection.
On the morning of the attack, they used Iranian-backed electronic warfare support to jam Israel’s border surveillance, including remote-operated machine guns and cameras along the Gaza fence.
For a short but critical period, the electronic eyes of the border went dark.
Human Error and Fatigue
Most border guards and observers (including those at Nahal Oz and Re’im) were young, often 18–20-year-old conscripts. They had repeatedly warned their superiors for months about hearing suspicious sounds (like underground drilling) and seeing Hamas exercises near the fence. Their warnings were largely dismissed.
Timing and Deception
The attack started at 6:30 a.m. on a Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, after a national holiday week (Simchat Torah). Many senior officers were at home, and the bases were lightly staffed. Hamas simultaneously launched a massive rocket barrage — more than 3,000 rockets in minutes — that overwhelmed Israel’s Iron Dome radar screens and delayed ground-attack detection.
AI and Sensor Overload
Israel’s surveillance system along Gaza (including cameras, drones, and radar sensors) produced huge data volumes.
AI filters helped analyze it, but analysts later said that Hamas’s simulated “training exercises” had appeared so routine that the AI flagged them as low-threat patterns — another layer of blindness.
Intelligence Disconnect
Egypt and even U.S. sources reportedly warned Israel of unusual Hamas activity days before the attack, but the Israeli intelligence community didn’t act. The October 7 failure was not from lack of technology — Israel’s surveillance is among the world’s most advanced — but from a fatal combination of complacency, human dismissal, and Hamas’s sophisticated deception tactics.
Hamas disabled the border surveillance system step-by-step that morning!
Here’s the detailed picture of that ignored Hamas battle plan, often referred to inside Israeli intelligence as “Jericho Wall.”
The “Jericho Wall” Document
- In 2022, Israeli military intelligence obtained a 41-page Hamas battle plan outlining a full-scale assault on Israel from Gaza.
- The document precisely described a multi-front invasion, involving:
- Rocket barrages to overwhelm defenses.
- Drone strikes on surveillance towers.
- Motorbike and paragliding incursions over the fence.
- Assault teams storming bases and kibbutzim, taking hostages and cutting communications.
- Every major component of this document matched what Hamas executed on October 7, 2023 — almost step for step.
Why Was It Ignored?
- Misinterpretation by Analysts
Israeli intelligence officers acknowledged receiving and translating the plan but assessed it as “aspirational” — a symbolic exercise rather than an operational threat.
The prevailing belief was that Hamas was too deterred and too weak to carry out something so complex. - Overconfidence in the Barrier System
Israel had spent billions on the “smart fence” and underground anti-tunnel barrier along Gaza.
Commanders trusted it so deeply that they thought any breach would be detected instantly — a grave misjudgment. - Failure to Connect Intelligence Dots
In the months before the attack, analysts observed Hamas training that matched the plan’s stages: drone attacks, mock fence breaches, and base assaults.
But without re-examining “Jericho Wall,” these clues were dismissed as routine drills. - Institutional Complacency
A classified review later found that a “culture of dismissal” had set in — junior officers who raised alarms about Hamas’s readiness were told they were overreacting.
The Result
When Hamas launched the assault on October 7, it executed the Jericho Wall plan almost word for word.
Israeli intelligence was, in effect, watching a blueprint it already possessed come to life — too late to act on it.
July 2023 — Alarm from the Field
- A female surveillance commander in the Gaza Division filed a report stating Hamas training exactly matched Jericho Wall’s sequence.
- Her superior’s written reply: “Hamas does not seek conflict. Their exercises are defensive.”
- Internal briefings continued to rank a Hamas invasion as “low probability, high consequence.”
October 06 2023 — The Day Before
- Egypt reportedly warned Israel through intelligence channels that “something big is coming from Gaza.”
- Israeli command interpreted it as rhetoric or possible limited rocket fire — not a ground assault.
- Border outposts remained with weekend staffing levels; senior commanders went home for Simchat Torah.
Anyone reasonable intelligent would find this summary suspicious.
Considering that Israel knew about the “Jericho Wall” almost one year before the attack and later warned repeatedly by Egypt and also by their own staff it would not be difficult to presume that Israel was USING the attack in order to justify their later DEFENCE attack on Palestine, with a view to take it over. CONNECT THE DOTS!!
